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On the Role of Sectoral and National Components 
in the Wage Bargaining Process 
 
This paper provides an empirical analysis on the determination of wages at the sectoral level 
in main industrial economies. Nominal wages are bargained between labour unions and 
employers in imperfect competitive markets, where spillovers across sectors might occur. 
Using a principal component approach, sectoral wage growth rates are separated into 
common and idiosyncratic components. This defines the relative role of national and sector 
specific conditions in the wage determination process. The common component is highly 
relevant especially in continental Europe, and is more visible for manufacturing than for 
services sectors. It reflects national inflation and productivity growth, while labour market 
tightness is negligible. The weight of the macroeconomic environment has declined in recent 
years. Wage growth tends to be more in line with idiosyncratic conditions like sectoral 
productivity and prices, probably due to the ongoing globalization of markets. 
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1 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to present evidence on the role of sectoral and national compo-
nents in the process of wage formation in continental European (Germany, France and 
Italy) compared to Anglosaxon countries (UK and US). Wages are crucial for determin-
ing the employment level in an economy. High weights of sectoral conditions in the 
wage determination process can relief the reallocation of labour in case of asymmetric 
shocks. In most industrialized countries wages are bargained between unions and em-
ployers or employer organizations. They are negotiated on the sectoral level, with an 
increasingly role for bargaining at the individual firm level (Du Caju, Gautier, Mom-
feratou and Ward-Warmedinger, 2008). Wage bargaining in continental Europe can be 
characterised by a regulated system, with a high level of collective agreement coverage. 
In contrast, the system in the Anglosaxon countries is highly deregulated, with low cov-
erage levels. 
The development of wages in one sector might be also infuenced by wages bargained at 
specific other sectors. In Germany, wages negotiated by the metal workers union often 
have a signalling function for the whole economy, and have caused significant wage 
spillovers to other sectors. According to the Scandinavian inflation model, wage setting 
in sectors exposed to international competition should influence wage setting in the 
sheltered sectors (Aukrust, 1977, Friberg, 2003). 
Due to the Calmfors and Drifill (1988) hypothesis, both highly centralized and decen-
tralized wage bargaining systems are expected to increase the employment level, while 
intermediate forms will exert a negative impact. On the one hand, wage setting institu-
tions might be more aware of the macroeconomic costs of agreements in centralized   3
bargaining systems (Calmfors, 1993). Therefore, they could pursue a moderate wage 
policy to avoid negative externalities in terms of rising unemployment and inflation. In 
this respect, the introduction of the euro area might have had an adverse effect, as it 
could have reduced the inflationary perceptions of unions. As they operate at a national 
level, they could take less care about area wide inflation (Cukierman and Lippi, 1999, 
Grüner and Hefeker, 1999). On the other hand, flexible wage formation raises the ability 
of the economy to absorb shocks. This requirement has become more relevant in a fast 
changing economic environment due to the globalization of markets. In addition, na-
tional economic policies have become less important in particular in Europe. Exchange 
rate or monetary policies are no longer at the disposal of individual euro area member 
states and fewer opportunities for independent fiscal policies limit the capacity of the 
economies to react against adverse shocks. Hence, wages have to bear a higher part of 
the adjustment process (Frankel and Rose, 1998). As the financial crisis has led to a 
substantial increase in unemployment in many countries, this role has become even 
more important. 
This paper examines to what extent wage developments are driven by common (trans-
sectoral) or idiosyncratic (sector specific) components, and whether the relevance of 
these components have shifted over time. If wage bargaining is decentralized, sector 
specific variables dominate, and wages are closely related to individual market condi-
tions. In more centralized bargaining systems, previous wage settlements may permeate 
throughout the economy. Industry shocks can take longer to affect wages even though 
the environment has changed. Due to advances in economic integration, competition has 
intensified in many branches. Thus, the weight of transsectoral factors in the determina-
tion of wages is expected to decline.   4
This presumption is examined on the base of a large panel dataset for the period 1977 to 
2007. Data are available for 25 manufacturing and services sectors. The common com-
ponents are extracted from sectoral wage inflation rates by factor analysis. The results 
reveal a relatively high degree of centralization of wage bargaining especially in conti-
nental Europe: the first common component is often able to explain more than 70 per-
cent of overall wage fluctuations. The role of sectoral conditions like industrial produc-
tivity and inflation is rather minor. Common components are less important for wage 
formation in the Anglosaxon countries. Moreover, wage spillovers appear to be more 
pronounced in manufacturing sectors when compared to services. For all countries cov-
ered in the analysis, an increase in the relevance of sectoral forces can be observed since 
the 1990s. 
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the wage bargaining model in imperfect 
competitive markets is reviewed, taken nominal wage spillovers across the sectors into 
account. Data issues are discussed in section 3, and the empirical analysis is presented 
in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2  Wage bargaining in a market-institutional framework 
The existence of wage spillovers is consistent with standard hypotheses of wage deter-
mination and with institutional theories that emphasize wage leadership or the existence 
of historical wage differentials (Eckstein and Wilson, 1962, Addison and Burton, 1979). 
For a key group of industries, changes of wages are determined by sectoral conditions. 
If markets are not perfectly competitive, product rents can be shared between firms and 
workers, depending on their relative bargaining power. The latter is related to the degree   5
of labour market tightness. Higher unemployment will ceteris paribus increase the com-
petition for job vacancies, with probably adverse effects on wage demands of insiders. 
Outside a key group of industries, wages are determined by wage spillovers. 
Due to the important role of collective agreements, the wage equation is specified in a 
bargaining framework. Nominal wages are negotiated at the sectoral level between trade 
unions and firms or their organizations, see for example Layard, Nickell and Jackman 
(1991), Nickell, Vainiomaki and Wadhwani (1994) and Lever and Marquering (1996). 
Firms maximize profits and unions maximize expected income for their members, who 
are the incumbent employees. It is assumed that the firms face imperfect competition in 
the product market, where the demand for goods is subject to exogenous shocks. The 
production technology can be described by a Cobb Douglas function with constant re-
turns to scale, where capital Ki and employment Ni are the input factors for the ith sec-
tor. The bargaining parties agree about nominal wages. Based on the negotiated wages, 
firms set prices Pi and determine the levels of output as well as labour and capital as 
input factors. By maximizing a Nash bargaining function, Layard, Nickell and Jackman 















where Wi denotes the wage of the ith sector, A is the alternative income, α labour inten-
sity, i.e. capital per unit of labour, κi the degree of competition in the respective product 
market, ε the absolute elasticity of survival with respect to the negotiated wage, which 
depends on the probability of a union member to stay employed in the subsequent pe-  6
riod (the probability of survival) and the employment level, and βi the sector bargaining 
power of unions. Alternative income is specified as 
(2)  ( ) 1( ) ( ) , 0 1 Au W u B θθ θ =− + <<  
where W is the wage rate in the overall economy, B denotes unemployment benefits and 
θ(u) is the probability that an employee made redundant does not find a job elsewhere in 
the economy. The probability to stay in unemployment rises with the unemployment 
rate u. By substituting (1) into (2) we obtain 
(3) 
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where b=B/W is the unemployment benefit ratio. This equation states that the mark up 
depends on the unemployment benefit ratio and the probability to find a new job. To 
investigate the impact of explanatory variables (Pi, Ki, Ni, W, b, u and κi) on the deter-
mination of sectoral wages the total differential of equation (3) is explored. Denoting 
the logs of the variables by lower case characters, this leads to 
(4)  12 3 4 [( 1 ) ( ) ] ( 1 ) [ ] ii i i i i dw dp dk dn dw db du d λ αλ γ γ γ κ γ β =+ − − + − + +++  
where pi is the sector product price. Coefficients are given in the appendix. This rela-
tionship is the justification for writing sector wages as a log linear approximation of 
internal and external (macroeconomic) factors, competition in the product market and 
union bargaining power. The equation also demonstrates that the weight λ of internal 
factors and 1-λ of external factors add up to unity. Furthermore, it can be shown that   7
unemployment exerts a negative impact on the wage rate, while unemployment benefits 
and the bargaining power are expected to enter with a positive sign (see Nickell, Vain-
iomaki and Wadhwani, 1994 and Lever and Marquering, 1996). The unemployment 
rate, the overall wage rate and the unemployment benefit ratio reflect the opportunities 
of employees outside the respective sector. The higher the overall wage rate, the unem-
ployment benefit ratio or the lower the unemployment rate, the lower are the costs for 
employees of quitting the sector and searching for a job elsewhere. Turning to the inter-
nal factors a rise in the sectoral output price, in the capital stock or a decline in the 
number of employees reduces the expected lay-off rate, thereby enabling the firm`s 
work force to increase the wage claim (Graafland and Lever, 1996). The impact of 
product market competition on wages is ambiguous. On the one hand side, an increase 
in market power raises wages because unions can expropriate part of the rents. On the 
other hand, there is a smaller probability of survival, as output and employment are re-
duced in monopolistic competitive markets. Equation (4) is the basis for the empirical 
analysis. In a stochastic environment, nominal wages essentially depend on both inside 
factors, such as industry prices and productivity, as well as outside factors, such as wage 
aggregates and the unemployment rate. 
 
3 Data  issues 
Data at the sectoral level are taken from the EU KLEMS database, see O’Mahony and 
Timmer (2009) and are available at http://www.euklems.net. Industries are classified 
according to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) scheme. The 
analysis is done for the largest continental European (Germany, France, and Italy) and 
the Anglosaxon economies (UK and US). Hourly nominal wages per employee are con-  8
structed by dividing nominal labour compensation of employees through the number of 
hours worked. Note that this concept refers to effective wages, since bargained wages 
are not reported at the sectoral level. Effective wages might differ from their bargained 
counterparts by the wage drift, i.e. a wedge due to overtime premia and gratifications. 
To the extent that effective and bargained wages are cointegrated, effective wages can 
be seen as a proxy for the latter. In addition, labour productivity per hour (real GVA 
divided by hours worked) and the GVA deflator (1995=100) are available for individual 
sectors. In case of the competition variables, no information is available for individual 
sectors. In the following, they are reflected in a constant. 
 
-Table 1 about here- 
 
Overall, the analysis is based on 25 industries at the annual frequency covering the time 
span 1977-2007. About 13 (10) branches can be classified as manufacturing (services) 
sectors. See Table 1 for the complete list of sectors. Macroeconomic series cover na-
tional labour productivity per hour, consumer and producer price indices, and the bene-
fit replacement rate. See also Bårdsen, Eitrheim, Jansen and Nymoen (2005) and Peeters 
and Den Reijer (2008) on the selection of these variables in the determination of nomi-
nal wages. The unemployment rate is from the AMECO database of the EU Commis-
sion. Labour productivity is in logs. Consumer and producer price inflation (annual 
changes of the respective indices) and unemployment are measured in percent. The 
benefit replacement rate is defined as the ratio of unemployment benefits to the wage in 
the overall economy and is obtained from the OECD. Wages and productivity enter the   9
analysis in first differences, and inflation, unemployment and the benefit replacement 




4 Empirical  results 
The first step is to establish some basic facts about sector wage developments for each 
country. Table 2 displays the mean and the dispersion of nominal wage growth, which 
is measured by the coefficient of variation. The values of these statistics are given over 
the whole period and two subsamples, 1977-1990 and 1991-2007, the latter broadly 
related to the period of globalization. 
 
-Table 2 about here- 
 
Annual nominal wage growth has declined in the latter period, where the decrease has 
been most pronounced in Italy and France. Wage inflation differentials between manu-
facturing and services sector are not very huge. The dispersion has increased both for 
manufacturing sectors and services. In relative terms the increase has been larger in con-
tinental Europe than in the Anglosaxon countries. This points to the lower relevance of 
common factors in the wage determination process. The results are broadly in line with 
survey evidence obtained from central bank experts (Du Caju, Gautier, Momferatou and 
Ward-Warmedinger, 2008). 
                                                 
2 Results not reported in the paper are available from the authors upon request.   10
According to the market institutional model of wage determination, wage inflation can 
be traced to sectoral and transsectoral forces. The latter are captured by the first princi-
pal components. They constitute the common element in nominal wage inflation. It may 
have a different weight in the bargaining processes of individual sectors. 
The number of principal components can be estimated by information criteria, see Bai 
and Ng (2002). The evidence is not very conclusive at this point, as the number of 
common components does not seem to be unique. While Akaike based measures usually 
identify four components, which is also the maximum specified in the analysis, Bayes-
ian criteria favour one or two principal components. Note that even the first principal 
component can be seen as sufficient to approximate the national factor, which accounts 
for a large share of the total variance of sectoral wage inflation. This is most striking for 
Italy, where the first component is able to represent about 82 percent, compared to 4 
percent attributed to the second most important component (see Table 3). The subse-
quent analysis is done with the first two principal components per country. This choice 
is not critical for the results, as the findings can be easily replicated when a different 
number of principal components are used. 
 
-Tables 3 and 4 about here- 
 
In general, wage spillovers tend to be higher in continental European, and lower in the 
Anglosaxon economies. For example, the first two principal components are able to 
represent 80 percent of the total variation in nominal wage growth in France. For the 
UK and US, this share is only about 60 percent. The hypothesis of a wage leadership of   11
a particular sector is not confirmed, as the loading coefficients do not reveal strong con-
spicuities. For example, the loading coefficients differ not very much across sectors (see 
Table 4). 
Note that the cumulative proportion of the variance attributed to principal components 
is not constant over time (Table 3). In line with the higher dispersion of wage inflation 
across branches, the shares have decreased in the second sample. This pattern can be 
detected for both manufacturing and services sectors, and appears to be most visible in 
the Anglosaxon countries, but also in France and in Italy. Compared to the other coun-
tries, a decline cannot be detected in Germany. Note that the overall tendency points to 
persistent differences of sectoral wage inflation. If wage growth tends to be equalized 
across sectors, the share attributed to principal components will converge to 1, while the 
dispersion will converge to 0. 
The decrease in the contribution of common components is most notable in France. Ac-
cording to Coelli, Fahrer and Lindsay (1994) the French wage dispersion has been out-
standing stable in the 1970s and the 1980s compared to other OECD countries, as wage 
setting institutions did not change substantially. Since the 1990s, the trade-off between 
real wages and unemployment has improved, probably due to a gradual change in the 
preference of unions towards a higher employment level (Estevao and Nargis, 2005). In 
addition, there has been a decreasing trend in union density, and a lower bargaining 
power of unions, see Heckel, Le Bihan and Montores (2008). The different experience 
in France and Germany might be also related to the process of European monetary inte-
gration. While competitive devaluations of the domestic currency have been observed in 
the former period in France, they have not been deployed in Germany. Thus, the higher 
exchange rate stability implied a higher burden of adjustment for French firms, leading   12
to higher wage divergence across sectors. The large persistence in Germany might be 
related to the fact that the introduction of the euro has changed the environment. Wage 
increases have been very moderate since then. The wage moderation took place in the 
manufacturing as well in the services sectors, and has been supported by economic poli-
cies. In contrast, Anglosaxonian countries can use the exchange rate to restore their in-
ternational competiveness. 
 
-Figure 1 about here- 
 
To investigate the relative role of sectoral and national factors in the process driving 
wage inflation, changes of sectoral wages are regressed on a constant, the common 
component and sectoral variables. To construct the common component, the first two 
principal components are weighted according to their eigenvalues. The first principal 
component dominates, as it has often a weight of 90 percent. The weight is slightly 
lower for the Anglosaxon countries. To save degrees of freedom, the sum of productiv-
ity growth and inflation enters as the sectoral determinant. The equations are estimated 
at the sectoral level. A restriction is embedded to ensure that the weights of national and 
sectoral regressors add up to unity, according to equation (4). The weights of the com-
mon component are displayed in Figure 1, where heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors fluctuate around 0.1. In general, the weight of the national component is higher 
for the manufacturing sectors (sectors 03-15, see figure 1). The most striking exception 
is financial intermediation (20), where the macroeconomic environment receives a rela-
tively high weight. In contrast, its weight is particularly low for public services. Hence,   13
models for wage inflation in the public sector should not be based on economy-wide 
conditions. 
 
- Table 5 about here- 
 
Further analysis reveals that the common component can be linked to macroeconomic 
developments to a large extent, see Table 5. In particular, the national component is 
driven by consumer price inflation and labour productivity growth. This coincides with 
the long run input rule of competitive markets that nominal wages are equal to the mar-
ginal product times the price level. Transformed this relationship into growth rates the 
changes of the nominal wages should be equal to the sum of productivity growth and 
the inflation rate. The coeffcients indicate that unions are more successful to enforce 
their demands, as the average consumer price inflation is usually higher than for pro-
ducer prices. The tightness of the labour market does not play a role in most countries, 
indicating that outsiders have a low weight in the bargaining process. As an exception, 
the lagged change in the unemployment rate is almost significant at the 0.05 level in 
Germany. The minor impact of labour market conditions is in line with the results of 
Dreger and Reimers (2009), who present evidence in favour of hysteresis in the EU and 
US unemployment rate. In addition, Germany is the only country with substantial per-
sistence in the wage determination process. Thus, nominal wages react more slowly to a 
changing economic environment. 
Although the regression coefficients reveal some variation, the fluctuations do not ap-
pear overwhelmingly strong. According to the cusums of squares, the fundamental pat-  14
tern to explain the common component has not shifted over time (Figure 2). Finally, it is 
worth to recall that unions maximize expected income. This implies that they should 
establish a forward looking behaviour. A test of this hypothesis is to include the leads of 
inflation and productivity growth in the equation explaining the common component. 
However, both variables are not significant. In this sense, the relationships do not show 
signs of forward looking behaviour. 
 
-Figure 2 about here- 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper provides an empirical analysis on the determination of wages at the sectoral 
level in main industrial economies. Nominal wages are bargained between labour un-
ions and employers in imperfect competitive markets, where spillovers across sectors 
might occur. The theoretical model is investigated by a principal component approach, 
where sectoral wage growth rates are separated into common and idiosyncratic compo-
nents. In regression models for the common component, national inflation and produc-
tivity growth dominate, while labour market tightness is negligible. 
Wage spillovers are higher in the continental European, and lower in the Anglosaxon 
economies. In line with the higher dispersion of wage inflation across sectors, the shares 
of the common component in the wage determination process have decreased in the 
second subsample. Increases of nominal wages tend to be more in line with individual 
conditions like sectoral productivity and output prices, probably due to advances in the 
globalization of markets. In general, the weight of the common component is higher for   15
the manufacturing than for services sectors. One striking exception is financial interme-
diation, where the macroeconomic variables are highly weighted. In contrast, the weight 
is low for public services. Hence, models for wage inflation in the public sector should 
not be based on economy-wide conditions. 
In the euro area, exchange rate and monetary policies are no longer at the disposal of the 
individual member states. In addition, fewer opportunities for independent fiscal poli-
cies limit the capacity to react against adverse shocks. Therefore, the process of wage 
determination becomes more important for a sound economic development. In particu-
lar, a smooth adjustment of wages is required to react to a fast changing environment. 
This is even reinforced in times of the financial crisis. While nominal wages are bar-
gained between unions and firms or their organizations, policies should not try to reduce 
the dispersion in the outcome across sectors. 
   16
References 
Addison, J.T., Burton, J. (1979): The identification of market and spillover forces in 
wage inflation: A cautionary note, Applied Economics 11. 
Aukrust, O. (1977): Inflation in the open economy: A Norwegian model, in Krause, L. 
B., Salant, W. S.: Worldwide inflation: Theory and recent experience, 107-153, Brook-
ings, Washington. 
Bai, J., Ng, S. (2002): Determining the number of factors in approximate factor models, 
Econometrica 70, 191-221. 
Bårdsen, G., Eitrheim, Ø, Jansen, E.S., Nymoen, R. (2005): The econometrics of mac-
roeconomic modelling, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Calmfors, L. (1993): Centralization of wage bargaining and macroeconomic perform-
ance – A survey, OECD Economic Studies, 161-191. 
Calmfors, L., Drifill, J. (1988): Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeconomic 
performance, Economic Policy 6, 13-61. 
Coelli, M., Fahrer, J., Lindsay, H. (1994): Wage dispersion and labour market institu-
tions: A cross country study, Discussion Paper 9404, Economic Research Department, 
Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Cukierman, A., Lippi, F. (1999): Central bank interdependence, centralization of wage 
bargaining, inflation and unemployment – Theory and some evidence, European Eco-
nomic Review 43, 1395-1434. 
Dreger, C, Reimers, H-E. (2009): Hysteresis in the development of unemployment: The 
EU and US experience, Spanish Economic Review 11, 267-276.   17
Du Caju, P., Gautier, E., Momferatou, D., Ward-Warmedinger, M. (2008): Institutional 
features of wage bargaining in 23 European countries, the US and Japan, ECB Working 
Paper 974, Frankfurt/M. 
Eckstein, O., Wilson, T. (1962): Determination of money wages in the American indus-
try, Quarterly Journal of Economics 76, 379-414. 
Estevao, M., Nargis, N. (2005): Structural labor market changes in France, IZA Discus-
sion paper 1621. 
Frankel, J.A., Rose, A. (1998): The endogeneity of the optimum currency area criteria, 
Economic Journal 108, 1009-1025. 
Friberg, K. (2003): Intersectoral wage linkages in Sweden, Sveriges Riksbank, Working 
Paper Series 158. 
Graafland, J. J., Lever, M. H. C. (1996): Internal and external forces in sectoral wage 
formation: Evidence frm the Netherlands, Oxford Bulletin of Ecnomics and Statistics 
58, 241-253. 
Grüner, H.P., Hefeker, C. (1999): How will EMU affect inflation and unemployment in 
Europe?, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101, 33-47. 
Heckel, T, Le Bihan, H., Montornes, J. (2008): Sticky wages: Evidence from quarterly 
microeconomic data, ECB Working Paper 893. 
Layard, P.R.G, Nickell, S.J., Jackman, R. (1991) Unemployment: Macroeconomic per-
formance and the labour market, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Lever, M.H.C., Marquering, W.A (1996): Union coverage and sectoral wages: Evidence 
from the Netherlands, Empirical Economics 21, 483-499.   18
Nickell, S.J., Vainiomaki, J., Wadhwani, S. (1994): Wages and product market power. 
Economica 61, 457-473. 
O’Mahoney, M., Timmer, M. P. (2009): Output, input and productivity measures at the 
industry level: The EU KLEMS database, Economic Journal 119, F374-F403. 
Peeters, M., Den Reijer, A. (2008): On wage formation, wage development and flexibil-
ity: A comparison between European countries and the United States, Applied Econo-
metrics and International Development 8, 59-74.   19
Table 1: Sectors covered by the analysis 
01  Argriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
02 Mining  and  quarrying 
03  Food, beverages and tobacco 
04  Textiles, textile, leather and footwear 
05  Wood and of wood and cork 
06  Pulp, paper, printing and publishing 
07  Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel 
08  Other non-metallic mineral 
09  Basic metals and fabricated metal 
10 Machinery,  Nec 
11  Electrical and optical equipment 
12 Transport  equipment 
13  Manufacturing Nec, Recycling 
14  Electricity, gas and water supply 
15 Construction 
16  Wholesale and retail trade 
17 Hotels  and  restaurants 
18 Transport  and  storage 
19  Post and telecommunications 
20 Financial  intermediation 
21  Real estate, renting and business activities 
22  Public admin and defence, compulsory social security 
23 Education 
24  Health and social work 
25  Other community, social and personal services 
Source: EU KLEMS Database.   20
Table 2: Sectoral wage growth 
  France  Germany  Italy  UK  US 
All  6.00  (0.64) 3.97  (0.56) 7.67  (0.46) 7.65  (1.01) 4.77  (0.57) 
Manufact  6.41  (0.48) 4.29  (0.62) 7.03  (0.37) 7.56  (0.72) 4.57  (1.21) 
1977-07 
Services  5.50  (0.59) 3.64  (0.54) 7.44  (0.56) 7.54  (0.65) 5.08  (0.43) 
All  9.74  (0.37) 5.04  (0.31) 13.0  (0.31) 10.9  (0.89) 6.06  (0.42) 
Manufact  10.3  (0.33) 5.39  (0.29) 11.5  (0.31) 11.0  (0.31) 5.68  (0.38) 
1977-90 
Services  8.82  (0.40) 4.66  (0.25) 12.6  (0.36) 10.7  (0.60) 6.77  (0.34) 
All  3.31  (0.83) 3.20  (0.74) 3.79  (0.57) 5.27  (1.10) 3.90  (0.67) 
Manufact  3.62  (0.60) 3.50  (0.86) 3.82  (0.41) 5.08  (1.01) 3.84  (1.77) 
1991-07 
Services  3.10  (0.73) 2.92  (0.75) 3.75  (0.71) 5.25  (0.68) 3.96  (0.50) 
Note: Unweighted figures in percent. Entries refer to mean, entries in brackets to the dispersion measured 
by the coefficient of variation. Overall 25 sectors, 2 agricultural and mining, 13 manufacturing (including 
construction) and 10 services sectors (including public services). 
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Table 3: Principal component analysis of sectoral wage inflation 
   France  Germany  Italy  UK  US 
All  75.8 | 79.8  64.7 | 71.4  82.0 | 85.8  49.3 | 57.6  49.5 | 58.7 
Manufact  78.0 | 82.8  63.1 | 73.5  91.2 | 93.7  56.7 | 66.8  51.6 | 65.3 
1977-07 
Services  80.8 | 85.7  75.5 | 83.0  76.5 | 84.7  58.9 | 73.1  60.9 | 70.5 
All  73.9 | 80.2  62.5 | 72.1  73.0 | 80.4  56.7 | 67.7  62.0 | 71.3 
Manufact  69.2 | 78.7  62.2 | 74.0  83.0 | 88.8  70.0 | 81.2  68.0 | 77.6 
1977-90 
Services  83.6 | 89.8  72.6 | 83.7  71.6 | 85.9  59.0 | 65.6  63.6 | 75.7 
All  30.0 | 43.1  62.2 | 70.2  56.0 | 65.4  26.5 | 40.9  26.6 | 46.2 
Manufact  38.3 | 55.9  60.3 | 72.6  73.7 | 81.4  31.6 | 50.5  31.5 | 58.5 
1991-07 
Services  41.1 | 59.6  75.9 | 84.8  38.0 | 58.4  33.9 | 54.8  31.0 | 49.4 
Note: Figures denote cumulative proportion of overall variance attributed to the first two common com-
ponents. First entry refers to the first; second one to the first two common components. Overall 25 sec-
tors, 2 agricultural and mining, 13 manufacturing (including construction) and 10 services sectors. 
   22
Table 4: Loading coefficients of principal components of sectoral wage inflation 
Country  Loading of PC1  Loading of PC2 
France  0.22 (06) | 0.22 (15)  -0.45 (25) | 0.39 (03) 
Germany  0.24 (16) | 0.23 (24)  0.60 (12) | -0.43 (17) 
Italy  0.21 (07) | 0.21 (09)  0.65 (20) | 0.31 (12) 
United Kingdom  0.25 (07) | 0.24 (22)  0.54 (19) | 0.36 (02) 
United States  0.26 (16) | 0.24 (09)  0.43 (14) | 0.35 (03) 
Note: First element of each cell gives the value of the highest loading coefficient and second element in 
cell shows the value of the second highest loading coefficient in the respective principal component (PC). 
In parentheses are corresponding sector.    23
Table 5: Determinants of common component 











  0.778 
(0.047) 
  
















   
PC (-1)    0.613 
(0.133) 
   
R2  0.965  0.798  0.935 0.857 0.736 
DW  1.669  2.276  1.912 1.930 1.874 
Sample period 1977-2007. OLS regressions of the common component (PC) on their first lag and a set of 
macroeconomic variables, PRO=hourly labour productivity, U=unemployment rate. CPI and PRO in 
logs, ∆ first difference operator. Standard errors in parantheses. R2=Adjusted R-squared, DW=Durbin-
Watson-statistic. 
   24








































































































































































































































































































Note: Restricted least squares, 1977-07. Weight of common component in the determination of sectoral 
wages. Sectoral classification according to table 1.   26
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Note: Sample period 1977-2007. Dashed lines represent 0.05 significance levels.   28
Appendix: Coefficients of equation (4) 
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